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1. Introduction.
This paper is concerned with self-regulation through producer organiza-
tions (PO) as an alternative to market or public intervention and its focus is
on quality issues. A growing part of the literature now deals with quality. A
market failure for quality provision is often the starting point for the analy-
sis of some form of public regulation, even though it is often far from clear
whether public intervention can in fact contribute to its solution. Previous
analyses of the welfare e¤ects of quality regulation enforced at the Marketing
Order‘s level in the form of a minimum-quality standard show that it can
not be welfare increasing (Bockstael, 1984; Chambers and Weiss, 1992).
The approach of the paper is the explicit consideration of the democratic
process through which quality levels must be decided upon and enforced
in the PO. It distinguishes between a constitutional and a working phase,
which are analyzed taking into consideration the incentives of heterogeneous
producers, i.e., the constraints represented by the voluntary participation
and the asymmetric information about individual producers, in the spirit of
the mechanism-design literature and in a situation in which only one group
can be formed.
2. The model.
Consider an agricultural commodity as an experience good. Asymmet-
ric information could be alleviated by a common label which would help to
establish reputation for high quality. The problem for a group of farmers is
to decide whether to form a Producer Organization (PO) with common rules
about production and trade of products. If a PO is formed, a management
committee will be formed to execute the agreement. The group is made of n
heterogeneous producers, and assume that producers can be of 2 types: µ
H
denotes the high-quality type, which means a lower marginal cost of produc-
tion for quality, and µ
L the low-quality. For convenience, we assume n is anProducer Organizations and Self-Regulation in Agricultural Markets. 2
odd number and nL + nH = n:
Technology can be represented using a technology set: Tµi = f(x;q) :
x can produce q jµ
ig;where x 2 <+ is a vector of inputs and q 2 <+ is
the quality level. We normalize production level to unity to work only with
quality levels. Producers‘ choices can be indirectly represented with their
cost function: c(q;µ
i) = minxfwx : (x;q) 2 Tµig;where w is the vector of
input prices. We assume type µ
i member‘s cost of production, c(q(µ
i);µ
i), to
be twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, strictly convex in q and without




L) forall q, that is the marginal cost of quality is everywhere
higher for type µ
L. We consider risk-neutral producers whose preferences are
separable in income and e¤ort and whose pro…ts for the production of a unit
of good of quality q are: ¼(µ
i) = y(q) ¡ c(q;µ
i), where y(q) is the price each
producer receives from the PO for a unit of product of quality q.
The paper considers hidden information. Each producer has private in-
formation about his own type and the PO can observe and verify the quality
level provided by each producer ensuring that the payment to the producers
is a function of the quality provided, y(q). But the group can not observe
each producer type. The PO sells producers‘ commodity on the market and
the price it receives is related to the quality that the buyers expect, i.e.,
consumers‘ willingness to pay is a function of the average quality of the good
marketed by the PO. If q(µ
i) represents the quality of the good produced
by the producer of type µ
i, the average quality from the n producers partic-




i) and the consumers‘
willingness to pay equal to p(Q), with p0(Q) > 0 and p00(Q) < 0 .
The potential n members meet together to decide whether to form the PO
and how to run it. If the PO is formed, the producers would pool together
their production under the collective brand and would receive a price in the
market according to the level of quality they provide. One feature of the
group is that it is a polity: any PO that is formed must be governed through
a democratic process and we consider the case in which the decisions are
made according to majority rule. We are interested in the rules about the
payments to and the quality level provided by di¤erent producers.
Each individual behaves in his own interest and votes for the rules that
best suit hisown interests. It is reasonable to think that given the assumption
about types two contracts emerge, one that is optimal for low-type and one
for high-type producers. The PO adopts what is voted by the majority of
the producers. Each producer can expect that what he can get from theProducer Organizations and Self-Regulation in Agricultural Markets. 3
PO is ”bounded”. Indeed, he cannot receive less than what he would get
from his outside opportunities, because otherwise he would be better o¤ not
participating; and he cannot receive more than what is allowed by the fact
that the PO must break- even.
The idealized situation can be translated into a game. Nature at the
beginning decides the distribution of the n producers between the two types
nL and nH. Farmers have private information about their own type, but
the distribution of types (Nature‘s choice) is not known. If nL > nH, there
is a low-quality majority, while if nH > nL the majority is of high-quality
producers. The …rst phase is the constitutional choice: producers vote and
agree on the set of rules for the producer organization. We assume that the
set that gets the majority of the votes wins. The next is the working phase:
producers can either reject or accept the contract.
This one-shot game can be solved by backward induction. The optimal
contract in the …rst phase can be found taking into account the incentives
in the second phase. We use mechanism-design, where a mechanism is the
combination of payments to and quality level provided by producers, i.e.,
(y(µ
i);q(µ
i)). The revelation principle (Myerson, 1979) allows to focus on
direct revelation mechanisms, constructed so that it is in each producer‘s
interest to tell the truth. One can design a contract in which producers tell
the truth provided it is incentive-compatible. Hence, any payment schedule















From eq. (1) follows the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Any mechanism (y(µ
i);q(µ






Among the contracts that are implementable, producers have to …gure





i) = 0; which says that each producer participates on a
voluntary basis and so must receive at least its reservation utility. This lat-
ter is set equal to zero since the alternative for the single producer is to go to
a competitive market with zero pro…ts. In addition, the PO must break-even,
that is: np(Q) ¡
PH
i=Lniy(µ
i) ¸ F: Note that np(Q) is the revenue - net of
processing costs - that the PO receives from selling the members‘ good in the
market and is a function of the average quality Q. The aggregate revenuesProducer Organizations and Self-Regulation in Agricultural Markets. 4
from the products sold in the market minus the payments to the producers
must cover the …xed costs F for the PO.
The outcomes of the game played in the following sections may be com-
pared with the equilibrium that would result with an Agency who sets up
a collective brand, has perfect observability (and veri…ability ) of quality,
no information on individual producers technology, and an utilitarian social
welfare function with unitary weights. In such a case the …rst-best equilib-
rium would be that each type produces the quality level up to the point in
which the marginal price from selling the commodity is equal to the marginal
cost of producing it, or the following …rst order conditions must be satis…ed:
p0(Q) = cq(q¤(µ
L);µ
L) and p0(Q) = cq(q¤(µ
H);µ
H). We call this the …rst-best
(FB).
3. High-quality majority.
The …rst case we consider is when Nature draws nH > nL and so the
majority is of high-quality producers. At the constitutional stage, they have
to pick the best of implementable and feasible contracts. The majority of
the votes goes to the optimal contract selected by high-quality types, that is
the program that has the objective the maximization of their pro…ts ¼(µ
H)

































The choice variables y(µ
i); q(µ
i) must satisfy Lemma 1; (ICL) and (ICH) are
the incentive compatible constraints; (PCi) are the participation or rational-
ity constraints of the two types with the outside opportunities; (BC) is the
break-even constraint. Following Grossman and Hart (1983), the problem























  - c(q(qL), qL)
c(q(qH), qH) 
  - c(q(qL), qH)
Figure 1. Budget (BC), participation (PC) and




The high-type producer …rst chooses the payment scheme that maximizes the
total payments to his type µ
H while satisfying all the constraints, and then
…nds the e¢cient level of quality to provide. Following the steps adopted
in Weymark (1986) and Chambers (1997), it can be shown that the PO’s
budget constraint (BC) is binding. The budget constraint, which negative




nH; is illustrated in …g. 1. If a solution to the
…rst stage exists then it must be in this line. Equation (1) gives the incentive












These are represented in …g. 1 as the two lines above the bisector for a
…xed q and given strict inequalities in Lemma 1. The payments to producers
that satisfy both the BC and the IC are then those in the BC line between
the two ICs. The last constraint to consider in this …rst step is the low-
quality type producers‘ participation constraint which can be represented as
a vertical line with the intercept y(µ
L) = c(q(µ
L);µ
L) which can intersect the
BC in the three regions we consider in the next sub-sections.
Participation constraint non-binding. Here we analyze the case, as in
…g. 1, in which PCL cuts the BC to the left and above point B. Since the
objective is to maximize type µ
H‘s welfare, the relevant point to consider isProducer Organizations and Self-Regulation in Agricultural Markets. 6
B. In the …rst step, the relevant constraints that are binding are the budget
constraint and the low-quality producer‘s incentive compatibility constraint

















L). As thislatterequation shows, the payment
for the low-quality type makes him just indi¤erent between his payment
scheme and the one intended for the high-quality should he, the low-type,
pose as high-type. In Guesnerie and Seade‘s (1982) terminology, this would
represent an upward link in the payment-quality schedule.
In the second step, the problem is the choice of the e¢cient quality levels.
FromLemma 1we know that q(µ
H) ¸ q(µ
L), and sowe can de…nean auxiliary
variable ® ¸ 0 such that q(µ
H) ¸ q(µ
L) + ® and which reduces the problem



















obtaining the …rst order conditions which after some manipulations and as-
















The optimal pricing mechanism requires low-quality types producing at the
point at which their marginal cost equals the marginal price the PO receives
fromthe sale of the commodity. At the same time, high-quality types produce





implies p0(Q) · cq(q(µ
H);µ
H). Note that the distortion for the high-quality
types is higher the wider the cost di¤erences with the low-type are and the
more numerous the group of low-type producers is. When both types‘ costs
are similar and low-quality types are few the distortion would be lower.
A policy that would implement such an optimal mechanism could be a
minimum-quality standard tailored to keep the low-quality types above their
reservation utility and a premium for high-quality products that would be
lucrative only for high-quality producers. The rule just described could end
up being a group that commercializes only products that are devoid of any
blemishes. Any consumer used to buying fruits would recognize that among
the commodities traded by those Orders with high-quality reputation it isProducer Organizations and Self-Regulation in Agricultural Markets. 7
almost impossible to …nd something di¤erent from a less than almost perfect
product.
Participation constraint binding. When the low-quality type‘s participa-
tion constraint cuts the budget constraint to the right and below point B, in
the …rst step the relevant constraints to consider are the budget constraint












latter equation shows, the payment for the low-quality type leaves him with
no rents. In the second step, the problem is the choice of the e¢cient quality


















Aftersome manipulationsthe …rst order conditionsgive the following p0(Q) =
cq(q(µ
H);µ
H) and p0(Q) = cq(q(µ
L);µ
L). When the high-quality types are in
the majority and decide the optimal mechanism, given that the rationality
constraint for the low-quality types in the minority is binding, they o¤er a
payment that is equal to the minority type’s cost of production and such that
the choice for the quality level is not distorted with respect to the …rst-best.
No feasible solutions. Here we consider when it is not feasible to form
a group, i.e., the minority type‘s participation constraint is to the right of
point A in …g. 1. At this point, the payment schedule makes the high-quality







…rst-best quality choice, q¤. Rearranging the budget constraint together with
the previous equation we obtain yA(µ









H)]: Now consider the payment for the low-quality type corre-
sponding to the same quality level but when the rationality constraint is























When this inequality is satis…ed the group may form, otherwise it can not.
Now notice when the minority type’s is binding. At point B in …g. 1







L), i.e., the low-quality type is indi¤erent between the
payment/quality combination intended for him and that intended for the
other type. Note that the quality level chosen is that corresponding to theProducer Organizations and Self-Regulation in Agricultural Markets. 8
…rst-best. Rearrange together the budget constraint with the previous equa-
tion to obtain y(µ








…rst best quality level. Now consider the payment for the low-quality type
corresponding to the same quality level but when the rationality constraint























When this inequality is satis…ed it is indeed feasible for the group to leave
some rents above their reservation utility to the minority type‘s producers.
The term on the left of the inequality can be interpreted as the size of the
opportunity to be taken, which is afunction of the demand parameters, minus
the costs of doing it. These latter depend on the …xed cost component, spread
among all the producers, and on the di¤erences between the two types. The
term on the right of the inequality is the payment for the minority‘s type
when his rationality constraint is binding. This inequality says that when
the ”size of the cake” is big enough, then it is optimal for the majority to
leave some rents to the minority‘s producers. Vice-versa, when there are not
big opportunities to be taken, or the group is relatively heterogenous, it is
optimal for the majority to leave the minority‘s producers at their reservation
utility.
4. Low-quality majority.
In this case Nature draws nL > nH and low-type producers have the
majority. The Board of Directors enforces a pricing mechanism that can be









subject to the same constraints de…ned in eq. (2). The maximand represents
the pro…ts of the low-quality type. Like in the previous case, the problem
can be decomposed in two steps, the choice of the payment scheme and the
e¢cient level of quality. Using the same arguments, it can be shown that
the PO‘s budget constraint is binding. Eq.(3) gives the incentive compatible
constraints that must be satis…ed and that are represented in …g. 1. The par-
ticipation constraint to consider now is the high-quality type‘s, represented




majority, only two regions are relevant. The …rst is when the participationProducer Organizations and Self-Regulation in Agricultural Markets. 9
constraint is not binding, i.e., it is below point A. The second is when the
participation constraint cuts the BC above point B (no feasible solutions).
Participation constraint non-binding. Using the same procedure, we …nd
















When low-quality producers have the majority, their choice of the pricing
mechanism induces high-quality producers to produce at their marginal cost,
and o¤er them a payment that leave them just indi¤erent between it and the
payment intended for low-quality types. Low-quality producers produce less
than the …rst-best. The Producers Organization produces at a lower quality
level, since the majority of producers - the low-quality type - is relatively
ine¢cient at providing quality. In this way they maximize their pro…ts and
have the high-quality members making some positive pro…ts. A policy that
could implement this optimal mechanism would pay a relatively high price
to low-quality products and would have a relatively low premium for high-
quality ones.
No feasible solutions. In the case of low-quality majority, the minority
type‘s participation constraint can never be binding: if the high-quality type
is left with no rents, i.e., y(µ
H)¡c(q(µ
H);µ




H) > 0. The fact is that the high-quality type can
always pretend to be a low-quality type and get higher pro…ts than this latter







H) ¸ 0. But this would contradict the incentive compatibility







H). The only way to leave the high-quality type at no rents would
be to o¤er a payment/quality combination that would make the low-quality
to earn negative pro…ts. But this of course in not reasonable. With a low-
quality majority, the high-quality minority‘s producers will be always left
with some rents above their reservation utility.
The other problem is for what parameter values it is feasible to form a
group, i.e., the participation constraint of the minority‘s type below point
B. At this latter point, the payment schedule leaves the low-quality type
indi¤erent, with the …rst-best quality. Using the same line of arguments ofProducer Organizations and Self-Regulation in Agricultural Markets. 10



















When this inequality is satis…ed the group may form, otherwise it can not.
5. Concluding remarks.
This paper studies the interaction of asymmetric information and the de-
mocratic process in the quality choices of a group of heterogenous producers.
It presents the pricing rules and the quality provision in a group of producers
(PO) facing an opportunity to gain from their collective capacity to establish
a reputation for their quality products. This paper makes the choice of the
PO‘s pricing mechanism endogenous, compares di¤erent equilibria and for
each of them it determines the pro…t levels for producers. When conditions
are not very favorable to the group, the majority‘s better choice is to drive
the minority producers to their reservation utility. When the conditions are
more favorable, the majority‘s better choice is to leave some positive pro…ts
to the minority‘s types in order to provide an incentive-compatible payment
scheme.
We …nd an asymmetry between the low-quality and the high-quality ma-
jority with respect to whether the rationality constraint is binding. When
low-quality producers are in the majority, they …nd convenient to have the
high-quality producers in the group to increase the average quality and the
price that the group can receive. Since high-quality types are more e¢cient,
they always have to be ”bribed” to stay in the group. In other terms, they
can not be driven to their reservation utility because they could just mimic
the low-quality producers and earn more pro…ts.
In the case of high-quality majority, only when the opportunities to be
seized by the collective action are relatively big the low-quality types must
be left with some rents. Indeed, if the two types are relatively similar o¤ering
to the low-quality type a payment that drives him to his reservation utility
would not be incentive-compatible. High-quality producers would prefer in
most cases to have the low-quality producers in the group, even if this implies
a lowering of the average quality, because they can extract some of the pro…ts
of the minority and keep it for themselves.
References.
Bockstael, N. The Welfare Implications on Minimum Quality Standards.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 1984; 466-471.Producer Organizations and Self-Regulation in Agricultural Markets. 11
Chambers, R. G. Information, Incentives, and the Design of Agricultural
Policies. In Gardner, B. L. and Rausser, G. (Eds.), Handbook of Agricultural
Economics, forthcoming.
Chambers, R. G. and Weiss, M. D. Revisiting Minimum-Quality Stan-
dards. Economics Letters. 1992; 40(2):197-201.
Grossman, S. J. and Hart, O. D. An Analysis of the Principal-Agent
Problem. Econometrica. 1983; 51 (1): 7- 45.
Guesnerie, R. and Seade, J. Nonlinear Pricing in a Finite Economy. Jour-
nal of Public Economics. 1982; 17:157-179.
Myerson, R. B. Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem.
Econometrica. 1979; 47:61-74.
Weymark, J. A Reduced-Form Optimal Income Tax Problem. Journal of
Public Economics. 1986; 30:199-217.